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Dynamics of power in contemporary media policy-
making  
Des Freedman  
GOLDSMITHS COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON  
 
One of the most remarkable aspects of the controversy surrounding the 
Federal Communication Communication’s (FCC) review of US media 
ownership rules in 2003 was the passionate participation of the public. While 
hundreds of thousands of critical responses flooded into the offices of the 
FCC and congressional staff, public meetings across the US were packed out 
with citizens, largely hostile to the FCC’s proposals to loosen ownership 
regulations and the prospect of increased consolidation. Such levels of 
involvement were unprecedented given the public’s traditional reluctance to 
get involved in issues concerning the ‘shape’, rather than the content, of the 
media. This reluctance is partly due to a perception of the policy-making 
process as remote and overly technical, the domain of engineers, lawyers and 
civil servants, and partly because the media have failed to register as a key 
part of public policy-making as compared to health, education or taxation.  
 
Public indifference is mirrored by the lack of media studies literature on ‘the 
formation of public policy more generally’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2005). A focus on 
the policy-making process is needed because, at a time of considerable 
change in the global media environment, new actors, technologies and 
paradigms are emerging that are creating new conflicts, or accelerating 
established ones, in media policy-making, for example in terms of national vs. 
supra-national levels of policy-making, public vs. corporate interests, 
centralized vs. dispersed policy networks, secretive vs. transparent forms of 
decision-making, and separate vs. converged policy fields.  
 
For some, the trend in policy-making is towards a more ‘open’ and 
‘accountable’ process involving a variety of ‘stakeholders’ engaged in a  
‘conversation’ about the future of the media industries. This perspective 
implies a pluralist conception of a competitive, and ultimately fair and efficient, 
mode of decision-making and relates back to debates in public policy 
formation from the 1950s and 1960s. Others paint a far more critical picture, 
arguing that there is an unmistakably neoliberal character to contemporary 
policy-making which subsumes the distinctive characteristics of media goods 
and flows in a market-driven approach. Reflecting on the US experience, 
Robert McChesney argues that there has been a progressive deterioration of 
transparency and public participation, and a ‘decisive increase in the business 
domination of media policy making’ (2004: 48). Colin Leys notes how public 
policy in every area of UK public life, including what he calls ‘public service 
television’, has been adapted to suit ‘the interests of corporations’ (2001: 56). 
Media policy-making, according to this perspective, is exclusive, unequal, 
distorted and ultimately undemocratic.  
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This article aims to illuminate the dynamics of, and balance of power, in the 
media policy-making process in both the US and UK in order to assess the 
legitimacy of these competing perspectives. It is based on off-therecord 
interviews with a range of participants in the policy-making process, including 
regulators, congressional staff, civil servants, special advisers, corporate 
lobbyists, public interest advocates, think-tank researchers, academics and 
trade officials. While not exclusively concerned with a comparative analysis 
between the respective systems, the article will attempt to mark out some of 
the similarities and differences between media policy-making in the US and 
the UK.  
Pluralism and public policy-making  
Many of the assumptions about the balance of power in contemporary policy-
making emanate from the rich debates in US political science that emerged in 
the second half of the last century. Theorists including Cater (1965), Dahl 
(1961), Freeman (1965) and Truman (1951) attempted to respond to wide-
ranging concerns about the growing influence of interest groups on the 
political process and the consequences for democracy. What united them in 
particular was a firm belief that no one group dominated the process, which 
was instead marked by vigorous competition between different participants 
drawn from Congress, federal agencies and specialized interests. Freeman 
(1965: 5) called for an emphasis on ‘subsystem actors’, a crucial element of 
‘the plural patterns of power and decision-making within the national 
government as they mirror the functional specialization and diversity of 
American society’ (1965: 6). Cater (1965: 17) described these highly 
segmented new policy spheres as ‘subgovernments’: compact networks of 
people with shared interests and the potential to challenge executive power. 
Freeman describes the triangular arrangement of congressional committees, 
executive bureaus and interest groups, which adds to the ‘complex and 
pluralistic committee matrix within which so many decisions are reached in a 
decentralized fashion’ (Freeman, 1965: 25). Public policy influence is 
therefore simultaneously dispersed and contained within these sub-systems.  
 
These pluralists argued that any danger of undue private interest group 
influence would be countered by the openness of, and multiple access points 
into, the policy-making process, which would actually add to the stability of the 
system. Far from one group being able to hegemonize control, these 
arrangements were designed to produce consensual and particularistic policy-
making bodies and coherent policy outcomes. Influence stems not only from 
economic power but also the prestige, profile and vision of the participants. 
The policy process is therefore a mirror of US society, itself described as a 
fairly open ‘mosaic of overlapping groups of various specialized sorts’ 
(Truman, 1951: 43).  
 
This picture of an open yet stable policy system relies on a conception of 
power as decentralized and multi-faceted: both formal and statutory (as in 
executive power) and, as Cater puts it (1965: 4), ‘mobile and transitory’ in the 
bargaining-led atmosphere of sub-government. Despite their emphasis on the 
dispersed nature of power, the pluralists did not deny that there were 
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inequalities in the political process, that some participants were better 
resourced and connected than others. The crucial point was that, in a 
situation of ongoing bargaining, these inequalities would cancel each other 
out. Critics from within the pluralist tradition recognized some of the limitations 
of the policy-making system and acknowledged the potentially de-stabilizing 
impact of interest group power on US public policy. In a system described by 
Theodore Lowi (1979: 51) as ‘interest-group liberalism’, the notion of sub-
governments and sub-systems was now seen as too rigid and narrow to 
articulate the pervasiveness of private interests as they were thoroughly 
mobilized throughout the policy process. Hugh Heclo spoke of the ‘fairly open 
networks of people that increasingly impinge on government’ (1978: 88) and 
whose influence depends not necessarily on money but on knowledge of the 
specific policy debate. These highly specialized ‘issue networks’ were not 
replacing the more formal and consensual sub-government model but were 
complicating policy scenarios and increasing unpredictability with their more 
ad hoc, dynamic and non-consensual style.  
 
Pluralist models of policy-making were taken up and developed by 
researchers who settled on the concepts of ‘policy communities’ and ‘policy 
networks’ as a means of capturing the precise environments in which policy 
formation takes place. While Grant Jordan (1990: 325) argues that there was 
‘no straight-line application of the US ideas to a British context’, there are 
clear genealogical similarities between US accounts of sub-governments and 
UK ‘policy community’ models as stable forms of decision-making based on 
shared values among long-term participants. Since then, the policy 
community has proved to be a very tempting normative concept, allowing 
scholars to assess whether a specific policy field is based on a highly 
integrated, long-term, consensual and select arrangement of people (in which 
case it qualifies as a policy community), whether it is a more loosely 
organized, short-term, open and discontinuous grouping (in which case it may 
be considered as an issue network), or any number of intermediate structures 
(see Rhodes, 1990, for a typology of policy networks).  
 
Despite the many criticisms made of the pluralist approach to policy-making 
and power (see, for example, Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Domhoff, 1967; 
Miliband, 1973; Mills, 1956), pluralist assumptions are still largely dominant in 
the academic study of UK and US policy-making. According to David Marsh, 
contemporary ‘reformed pluralism’ (2002: 16–17) is marked by a continuing 
belief in the diffuse nature of power and the increasingly sharp competition 
among interest groups for an influence in the policy-making process. To what 
extent does the rapidly expanding field of media policy-making sustain the 
pluralist account of power in the policy process and what are the claims made 
about this process by the participants themselves?  
Analysis of the media policy-making process  
A dispersed process?  
With the increasingly global organization of media businesses, the impact of 
digital technology and new platforms on media distribution, the economic 
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importance of content industries, and the hegemony of market-led 
approaches to the provision of goods and services, it is hardly surprising that 
media policy-making has expanded in scale and scope. The number of 
‘stakeholders’ has mushroomed in recent years, and voices that were 
traditionally peripheral to media policy debates have come to play a central 
role, crossing both departmental and geographical borders. The traditional 
‘sub-system’ of dedicated civil servants, legislators and select industry players 
has had to come to terms with the interventions of personnel from other 
domestic government departments, supra-national institutions and processes 
(like the European Union [EU] or the World Trade Organization [WTO]-
administered GATS [General Agreement on Trade in Services] agreement) 
and finally a whole range of religious, moral, consumer, activist and voluntary 
groups.  
 
Media policy has rarely been confined to a single location in government. In 
the US, both House and Senate sub-committees have overseen the work of 
the FCC and the Department of Justice has long been involved in anti-trust 
cases. Policy in the UK has traditionally been even more fragmented 
(Seymour-Ure, 1987), with responsibilities still divided between, for example, 
the Department for Media, Culture and Sport (DCMS), the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), the Foreign Office and the Treasury. However, 
‘ownership’ of media policy has become increasingly blurred – all major 
communications policy initiatives since the New Labour government took 
power in 1997 have been co-authored by the DCMS and DTI, resulting in a 
vigorous debate about whose imprint is the more dominant. Even in the US, 
policy is increasingly ‘splintered’ as agencies like the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration and the Federal Trade 
Commission along with the State Department and Department of Homeland 
Security all play an important role in shaping the US media environment (see 
RCFP, 2005, for a disturbing analysis of how the USA PATRIOT Act is 
restricting media freedom).  
 
Policy-making is also not confined to the national level. Domestic media 
systems are subject to a complex barrage of rules from bilateral trade deals, 
regional directives and multilateral trade disciplines. For example, the 
behaviour of national public service broadcasting channels in Europe is 
monitored by the European Commission’s Competition Directorate, which 
checks whether tight ‘state aid’ rules are being breached (see Tryhorn, 2005); 
many domestic copyright regimes have been transformed by treaties 
launched by the World Intellectual Property Organization; and current 
negotiations under the auspices of the WTO’s GATS instrument are 
attempting to impose strict trade disciplines on domestic audio-visual 
industries. Many of these developments are far from complete and policy-
making power remains largely nationally based, yet we are certainly seeing 
the emergence of new international pressure points on the media policy-
making process.  
 
The participation of an expanded number of interest groups is perhaps the 
greatest challenge to traditional modes of media policy formation. The 
influence of corporate lobbyists and trade associations is well established, 
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particularly in the US, but increasingly so in the UK as well. ‘Pressure groups’, 
too, have existed for a long time, but without the power and influence they 
now appear to wield. For example, in the USA, the Parents Television Council 
is credited with being a key influence on recent legislation increasing fines for 
‘broadcast indecency’ on American networks. The Consumers Union and 
Consumer Federation of America are highly significant mass-membership 
organizations that have prioritized issues such as media ownership and 
broadband access to great effect. The impact of media activist groups is more 
surprising. In the UK, the intervention during the passage of the 2003 
Communications Act of campaigning group Public Voice helped to secure a 
‘public interest test’ in the case of major media mergers, while the court case 
in the US that formally derailed the FCC’s ownership review in June 2004 was 
launched by the Prometheus Radio Project, a small collective of radio activists 
in conjunction with a legal team from the Media Access Project.  
 
Many interviewees agree on this point about the increasingly crowded nature 
of the policy-making universe. Reflecting on his experience of legislation for 
web content, the head of public policy for a large international firm comments 
that:  
More and more stakeholders are seeing themselves as such and are seeking to represent 
their interests more and more strongly and in more innovative ways with the decision-
makers. So there’s no doubt that, say in the example of child safety online, the number of 
stakeholders seems to grow almost monthly. . .. There are now maybe 15 representatives 
of industry, a dozen children’s charities, a dozen law and order agencies and different 
Home Office departments involved. So these things certainly do mushroom.  
A lobbyist for one of the biggest radio companies in the US notes that, 
because of consolidation, there are fewer licence holders but ‘a lot of other 
non-licence holders in the policy business right now’. Organized interests are 
complemented by the growing numbers of individuals seeking to make their 
voices heard. A reporter at the trade magazine Broadcasting and Cable in 
Washington DC argues that ‘there is much more public involvement now in 
the issues that I cover. I think in part it’s because people have realized how 
important media policy is and what an impact media consolidation has had.’ 
One public policy advocate talks of the ‘unprecedented public involvement in 
media policy debates. Nothing has happened like this since the advent of 
radio in the late 1920s and early 1930s.’ This perspective is shared even by 
one senior vice-president at a powerful media trade association:  
I believe that the 3rd Circuit decision [overturning the FCC’s ownership review] was 
influenced by an interesting sense of a grassroots feeling. . .. This was the first time I had 
ever seen a Court that was interested in ‘wait a minute. There was this hearing that was 
held out in South Dakota somewhere’ and that was part of the discussion.  
This paints a picture of a policy domain littered with participants and pulled in 
different directions by competing interests. To what extent is this perception 
true and, more importantly, how does it impact on the power of a policy 
‘centre’? First, there is no necessary relationship between the number of 
participants in a decision-making process and the eventual decision that is 
taken. Being a ‘stakeholder’, identifying yourself as someone who has an 
interest in the outcome of a decision, is in no way a statement about your 
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power. The explosion of ‘stakeholders’ is more likely related to the expansion 
of the media industries than it is to their ability to change the balance of power 
in a decision-making situation. As a member of a Washington DC think-tank 
puts it, ‘the fact that there is so much more legislating taking place is the key 
to understanding why there are so many more lobbyists and lobbying’. 
Second, when it comes to specific media policy issues, there is little evidence 
that we are dealing with a more devolved policy structure. ‘Ultimately’, argues 
a senior policy adviser to the UK government, ‘policy-making reflects the 
structure of the industry rather than the other way around’. In the case of 
distribution-led media industries, this suggests a high degree of centralization 
and control. This is borne out by the adviser who complains that:  
. . . as a sector, it [media policy-making] is amazingly insular and small. Another part of my 
job involves working in other stakeholder areas and there are very few industries and 
sectors [like media] where everybody knows each other and everyone worked together at 
one stage.  
This seems particularly to be the case in the UK where the 2003 
Communications Act was driven by a handful of figures inside Downing Street 
(most notably Ed Richards inside the Number 10 Policy Directorate) in close 
consultation with relevant ministers and special advisers. This is borne out by 
the inclusion of rules in the legislation that allow foreign ownership of 
television channels and, in particular, permit Rupert Murdoch to expand into 
terrestrial television – decisions that emanated, after heavy lobbying, from 
‘behind the heavy front door of No 10’ (Bell, 2005). ‘My sense of it’, recalls a 
very experienced contributor to UK media policy debates:  
. . . was that there was an agenda being run by a very small tightly knit clique of people, 
who were to some extent prepared to listen, but only within the very narrow bounds of their 
own idea of what should be done. So they had pretty clear parameters, they were prepared 
to listen to outsiders within those parameters, but actually I think it was more of a lobbying 
and PR effort.  
A slightly larger group of politicians lies at the core of media policy-making in 
the US, but one that is especially vulnerable to corporate persuasion. 
According to a public policy advocate on media issues:  
The most important players in communications policy are the members, and especially the 
chairmen, of the Energy and Commerce Committee on the House side and the Commerce 
Committee on the Senate side. All of whom are heavily lobbied by industry players. . .. 
They are the ones that make the laws and the FCC tries to enforce them. The FCC can 
only operate within the parameters set by Congress. Most members of Congress haven’t 
got any idea about communications policy. They get beyond the surface-level discussion of 
the issues and they are completely lost. So you’re really talking about 30 to 40 members of 
Congress on House and Senate side in total who understand the issues well enough to 
legislate on them.  
There is, therefore, an important distinction to be made between the size of 
the pools that surround the decision-making process – inhabited by an 
increasingly volatile mixture of civil servants, private and public lobbyists, 
regulators, individual citizens, politicians and academics – and the core 
members of this process who may choose to swim in the pools but who retain 
their own interests. This is summed up by the head of public policy of a major 
UK broadcaster who argues that:  
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. . . media policy is paradoxical. Because the media affect everybody, politicians and 
policy-makers care more about media policy than they do about steel policy or car policy. 
So in one sense everybody consumes it but, in another sense, the number of people 
making decisions is fairly small. . .. The decision-making is tight but the influence is broad.  
Debates and disagreements do take place in the process of policy formation 
but both the terms of these conflicts and their eventual resolution in specific 
policy instruments remain in the hands of a small decision-making elite.  
A transparent process?  
If there is a general perception that the number of stakeholders has 
increased, there is an even stronger belief amongst many participants that the 
media policy-making process (and, to a certain extent, media regulation) has 
become more open and accountable. Much of this is due to technological 
innovation, especially the emergence of the internet as an informational tool. 
Congressional hearings are streamed online with easy access to speakers’ 
transcripts, notices of forthcoming hearings and details of relevant legislation. 
Access to both current FCC investigations and past FCC decisions has been 
transformed by the internet. Every piece of correspondence and every 
meeting that relates to a particular proceeding is recorded online and any 
member of the public can contribute to FCC rule-making through its electronic 
filing system. As one corporate lobbyist puts it, ‘We are in the digital era 
where anyone, through either the FCC’s website or a public interest website, 
can chime in to any process.’ ‘Everything’, according to a senior FCC official 
involved in ownership policy, ‘is out in the open. We are the most transparent 
agency that I know of.’  
 
In the UK, the 2004/5 DCMS-led BBC Charter review process has been 
trumpeted as a model of transparency. Again, technology was central: 13 
seminars, organized by an ‘expert panel’ set up by the government to reflect 
on the future of the BBC, were webcast and a dedicated website provided 
containing transcripts, research findings, a summary of responses to the 
public consultation and other background information. But here openness was 
seen not simply in technological terms but as a means of ensuring the widest 
possible participation and debate. One of the civil servants responsible argues 
that it was quite different to previous reviews, given the level of public 
consultation, survey research and analysis carried out to ‘make for a better 
informed outcome’. Another senior policy adviser emphasized the need to 
recognize and confront the specific atmosphere in which the review was 
taking place: following the run-in between government and BBC over the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that culminated in the 
publication of the Hutton report in January 2004 which criticized BBC 
newsgathering and absolved the government of blame.  
The way in which to embrace a change agenda is to do it relentlessly in the open, 
acknowledging Hutton at every twist and turn and making sure it is clear that it is 
discounted. . .. Precisely because it has been such a stable open process, with an 
incredibly wide range of views brought in . . . because it has been relentlessly open, no one 
in any of those seminars is talking about Hutton. They just don’t. It’s not relevant.  
 7
This form of ‘transparency from above’ – making sure that policy is following a 
‘change agenda’ and that Hutton is ‘discounted’ – is replicated in the same 
adviser’s comments about the passage of the 2003 Communications Act.  
[Our approach was] a very inclusive one, which is that once government is clear about how 
it wants to construct a debate, to carry that debate as much as possible in public. So the 
communications bill went through an extensive series of consultations. No one could say at 
any point that there hadn’t been the widest possible involvement. Indeed, the industry 
complained massively of consultation fatigue which, I have to say, was also part of the 
policy, that we would much rather them complain of too much consultation rather than to 
say that there wasn’t enough.  
Once again, transparency follows the decision about how to ‘construct’ the 
debate, i.e. a decision on what issues are, or are not, permissible which, in 
the context of the 2003 Act, included a determination to secure ‘lighttouch’ 
regulation, increased foreign ownership of broadcasting and a liberalized 
radio market. A commitment to transparency does not, in itself, undermine the 
control of the policy agenda and may be more likely to legitimize the process 
in the eyes of the public. One critic of the legislation argues that the plethora 
of advisory groups, feedback loops and consultations (embodied by the UK 
regulator Ofcom’s launch of dozens of consultations in its short life):  
. . . are meaningful to the extent that, if there was an overwhelming response from the 
public in one direction or another, which was in direct contradiction . . . [to] the way that the 
government wants them to go, it would be very difficult for them to hold that line. So I think 
in that sense, they are an exercise in validating democracy, rather than real transparency 
or openness.  
A further shortcoming of this approach to transparency is that, while key parts 
of the media policy process may be better publicized, the actual details of how 
decisions are reached remain far more obscure. One trade reporter in 
Washington DC admits that, while the ‘FCC is more open than other regulator 
agencies in providing public access or information to the public about what 
media companies have asked the FCC to do . . . they are less accessible in 
talking about their internal deliberations’. This is perhaps even more of a 
problem in the UK, where there is no Administrative Procedures Act, which 
forces at least some degree of accountability on the US decision-making 
process. Indeed, one of the main exemptions of the recently introduced 
Freedom of Information legislation in the UK concerns material that relates to 
the formulation of government policy. Participants may be invited into the 
room but there are no requirements to reveal how seriously their views are 
taken or the means by which decisions are finally made. A highly experienced 
corporate lobbyist, who works on both sides of the Atlantic, argues that a 
degree of ‘intellectual transparency’ is needed.  
[There is a problem with] the procedure of white papers and green papers. Mr A said, Mr B 
said that, Mr C said this, Mr D said that and then they say we have decided this. How did 
you get there from a, b, c, d? No indication. I think there should be a requirement for 
analytical pathways so that the decision-makers must say how they got there from the 
evidence put in front of them. . .. If you read some of the green and white papers, it’s a nod 
to this guy and to this guy, as if to prove that somebody showed up and then they say, ‘and 
we decided’. How the hell did you get there?  
 8
The biggest threat to transparent policy-making, however, derives from the 
continuing and intimate relationship between key corporate interests and 
government policy-makers, a relationship whose bonds are rarely exposed to 
the public. This is partly a structural connection of the sort identified by 
Mitchell (1997) in his analysis of the ‘conspicuous corporation’. Business does 
not simply share common class interests with a political elite, corporations 
also ‘devote more attention and time to policy issues of concern to them, hire 
more lobbyists, commit more money in support of their political activities and 
goals, and have more mobility than other organized interests’ (Mitchell, 1997: 
220). It is not the case that lobbyists necessarily operate in secret, nor indeed 
that they always get their way, but that corporate interests increasingly 
circumscribe and swamp the policy-making sphere.  
 
This is, of course, far more of an issue in the USA, where lobbyists have long 
operated as a key part of the policy-making process. Many of the lobbyists 
interviewed describe themselves as ‘educators’, saving legislators time and 
money through the provision, when requested, of important data. Their role as 
‘persuaders’ is significant but harmless: ‘What you’re attempting to do is to 
take the body of fact as it exists and present it in a favourable fashion,’ as one 
senior vice-president put it. Arguments about regulatory and policy capture 
are dismissed – indeed, the outcry over consolidation and indecency shows 
that the notion that ‘legislators are simply marching to the industry’s beat is far 
from true’.  
 
However, recent figures revealing that the communications industry alone 
spent more than $1.1 billion lobbying federal government from 1998 to 2004, 
and that some 398 personnel passed through the ‘revolving door’ between 
government and industry during that time (Centre for Public Integrity, 2004), 
suggests another reading of the situation: that such setbacks are exceptions 
to the normally highly consensual relationship between government and 
media businesses. Policy-makers in Washington do have decisions to make 
but this is normally a case of arbitrating between rival commercial interests: 
they ‘umpire the lobbying contest and approve the final agreed consensual 
lobbying outcome’ (Tunstall and Machin, 1999: 51).  
 
From the campaign for commercial television in the early 1950s to the British 
Media Industry Group in the mid-1990s that pushed for liberalization of 
ownership laws, corporate lobbyists have also been active in the UK for some 
time. Their influence, however, was constrained by the existence of a mixed 
media economy and a residual commitment to public service broadcasting. 
Now, given the neoliberal perspective of the current Labour government, they 
find themselves operating in a far more welcoming environment and the 2003 
Communications Act was a particularly fertile period for lobbyists. For 
example, recent papers released from government archives reveal that 
representatives of Rupert Murdoch’s Sky Television met with ministers six 
times during the short passage of the communications bill in 2003. They show 
that ‘Mr Murdoch secured private reassurances from ministers during heavy 
lobbying that he would be able to buy Channel Five if he wanted to’ (Leigh 
and Evans, 2005). Such an outcome is perhaps not surprising, given the 
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enormous resources available to Murdoch as well as his long-established 
relationship with Tony Blair.  
 
A more resourceful example of lobbying concerns the UK independent 
television production sector whose trade association, Pact, claims success for 
introducing 66 points into the communications bill, the first draft of which 
made no reference at all to independents. An imaginative and persistent 
lobbying campaign aimed at securing the expansion of independent 
production focused on wining and dining parliamentarians (‘I almost lived in 
the Cinnamon Club around the corner from Westminster for about nine 
months,’ recalls one participant) and met with a positive response from a 
government that was receptive to arguments about granting a higher profile 
and more financial autonomy to the independent sector. Responding to the 
government’s desire to secure a more competitive media system, the 
campaign deliberately focused on themes of creativity and innovation.  
It was a deliberate strategy. We could see where the government wanted to go on this and, 
in fact, I think it was a recognition of what our sector does. But what we did was make sure 
we crafted the language better. So the whole thing about creative competition, freeing up 
markets, freeing up global competitive [flows], these were all things that we wanted to do 
but we recognized that this played into a government agenda as well.  
This suggests that a successful lobbying campaign depends on resources 
and political influence, but also on a sense that the issue connects with the 
broad ideological stance of key policy-makers. Lobbying is therefore not 
necessarily about overt corruption but also about common values. As one 
commentator on policy puts it:  
We are not talking about huge amounts of money being poured into almost bribing senior 
officials into taking the right line. I think it is more a question of pushing at an open door, 
building up the arguments that are sympathetic to their natural instincts.  
Either way, the idea that contemporary media policy-making is a model of 
transparency and accountability is flawed. The limited public involvement and 
parliamentary and congressional scrutiny that does take place is marginalized 
by a relationship between industry and government that is marked by its 
intimacy, lack of transparency and shared objectives.  
A logical process?  
Decisions made about the structure of complex symbolic media forms like 
press and broadcasting are made, in the eyes of many policy participants, 
with a Gradgrind-like commitment to facts. As few are able to agree on the 
meaning of foundational principles like diversity, pluralism, the ‘public interest’ 
and localism, US policy-makers in particular are turning to what they see as 
more reliable empirical methods. According to one corporate lobbyist, the 
FCC is ‘economics-driven now . . . anyone who wants to try and make an 
impact files economics studies now’. ‘We really are driven by the experts: the 
economists,’ agrees a senior FCC staffer. This reflects an instrumentalism at 
the heart of US media policy-making, that decision-making about the media, 
like any other area of public policy, should be guided by scientific, rather than 
abstract, principles. While policy-makers are still prepared to turn to 
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deliberative polling and focus groups to provide background information, they 
too are far from immune from the attractions of hard data. Ofcom, the new 
super-regulator that has an increasing influence on policy, boasts of an 
‘evidence-based approach’ – using techniques like consumer research, 
market data, market intelligence and technology research – even for rather 
amorphous concepts like ‘public value’ and of course ‘public service’.  
This empirical approach is theoretically designed to insulate the media policy-
making and regulatory domains from the partisan politics and ‘biased’ 
opinions that surround them. A common complaint made by corporate 
lobbyists in particular is that policy-making is skewed when politicians and 
members of the public with no expert knowledge but strongly held beliefs, 
start to interfere in the process. ‘It’s frustrating’, argues a lawyer for a well-
known DC legal firm:  
. . . because when there is so much public and congressional involvement, you start to get 
away from dealing with the facts and reality and the real essence of policy and instead are 
dealing with trying to knock down a lot of myths and misperceptions out there.  
The broadcast ownership debate, reflects another lobbyist, ‘turned out to be 
emotional once it went to Congress . . . for those who had staked out their 
territory as being anti-deregulatory, the facts didn’t matter.’ A logical 
procedure had become irrational.  
 
Those involved at the FCC in drawing up the liberalizing ownership rules are, 
not surprisingly given the Appeal Court’s rejection of its proposals, particularly 
bitter about the involvement of the public.  
X: We have this attachment to our television and we think we’re expert because we spend 
so much time watching it, just as individuals. . .. People feel they have a lot of expertise.  
Y: They feel like they understand the topic . . .  
X: They don’t have the time or the information to engage in that [necessary] level of 
intricacy on this and that’s why there is an expert agency to do this. And that’s why these 
decisions aren’t made by referenda.  
This ‘lack of expertise’ effectively disenfranchised the hundreds of thousands 
of individuals who wrote to the FCC in protest at the prospect of increased 
consolidation.  
X: The vast majority of comments that said ‘I’m against big media’ are not helpful at all on 
the merits and don’t add anything to the debate . . .  
Y: The difficulty in trying to use [those comments] is that we’re looking for comments that 
are well supported in evidence . . .  
X: Agencies have to make decisions based on the facts and it’s not terribly helpful to ask 
the average person ‘What do you think of this?’ because they will give you an overly 
simplistic answer. It’s not their fault but they can’t possibly know all the stuff that goes 
into making those decisions.  
This is an extraordinary admission of failure of public policy: that when the 
public responds in unprecedented numbers, they are deemed to be 
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‘unhelpful’. Pro-deregulation studies conducted for the FCC by a handful of 
economists proved to be more influential than the convictions of hundreds of 
thousands of citizens. The public are, however, both illinformed and a 
nuisance. Several corporate lobbyists complained that the involvement of 
ordinary people made their jobs more difficult.  
It used to be with legislation and at the FCC you could get stuff done quietly and there 
wouldn’t be anyone opposing to get it sort of done. It can’t be done any more. And I’m not 
saying that was a good way to do things, but I think that we have now gone the other way, 
to the other extreme, where the average citizen has no idea of the substance, but they’re 
told a way in and it tips the balance.  
Those lobbyists who believe that public policy is more effective without the 
public should not be unduly worried as the furore over ownership rules was, in 
many ways, the exception that proves the rule. Corporate lobbying continues 
to be highly effective, gratefully received by policy-makers and generally 
protected from the irritations of public ‘intrusion’.  
 
While a far more inclusive language is used about the role of the public in the 
UK policy process, the increasing reliance on quantitative data threatens to 
disempower individuals in the same way and to hand the initiative to ‘experts’ 
with a direct line to policy-makers. At least one experienced UK lobbyist is 
concerned about the implications of this development:  
You can take a purely fact-based approach to these things, an evidence-based approach. I 
don’t think that such an approach really exists. I don’t think there is an approach that exists 
without some kind of subjective view being taken, whether you call that political or not. 
People like to take the view that we can get the policy-makers out of these kinds of areas 
and let competition law regulate it. But competition law is not some kind of purist theory. 
You are still making value judgements about what you think is the right level of competition 
in the marketplace.  
A wholly empirical approach, furthermore, can also be very misleading, as the 
Third Circuit Court found in its rejection of the FCC rules. In one of many 
critical judgments, the Court disagreed with the FCC’s conclusion that all 
media outlets should be weighted equally in its measurement of diversity in a 
particular media market. The FCC’s heavily empirical Diversity Index ‘that 
requires us to accept that a community college television station makes a 
greater contribution to viewpoint diversity than a conglomerate that includes 
the third-largest newspaper in America . . . requires us to abandon both logic 
and reality’ (US Court of Appeals, 2004: 68). This suggests a problem, not 
with empirical methods in general, but with the use of selective facts and 
subjective judgements to support an argument that, in this case, increased 
consolidation would not negatively impact on media diversity.  
 
The privileging of highly selective empirical and evidence-based approaches 
to policy-making fails both to de-politicize and to make any more objective the 
decision-making environment. Policy-making in a sphere of such cultural and 
political significance is bound to be highly political and the fetishizing of 
‘scientific’ data is one means of marginalizing the public from the public policy 
process and safeguarding it for the economists, lawyers and executives who 




This article has dealt with only a few of the major points of contention in media 
policy-making today. It has not examined the extent to which policy-making 
dynamics may vary across different media forms, nor has it discussed specific 
cases where conflict arises between rival firms or between private interests 
and government. It has only hinted at the contentious role that media itself 
plays in media policy-making: as a (very) occasional reporter and, more 
importantly, as a public relations vehicle through which powerful actors are 
able to communicate with each other in order to manufacture ‘elite rather than 
mass forms of consent’ (Davis, 2002: 179). Neither has it explored whether 
policy-makers are able to be autonomous from private interests, nor has it 
fully considered ‘the strategic alliances made by policy-making parties with 
other social institutions’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2005).  
 
Instead, the article focuses on some core challenges to pluralist principles in 
the public policy-making process: the extent to which it is competitive, 
accessible, transparent and logical. The article argues that, despite the 
growing number of ‘stakeholders’, there has not been a significant challenge 
to the power of a central policy-making core. Key decision-makers operate in 
close ideological conformity with the broad interests of one key constituency – 
that of business – in a way that structures the parameters of the debate, 
dictates what forms of participation are most effective and conditions the 
balance of power in the policy process. While a range of voices may be heard, 
there is little opportunity to question the fundamental assumptions about the 
desirability of ‘competition’ and ‘consumer sovereignty’ that increasingly 
dominates media policy-making. The process is therefore skewed by a 
fundamental imbalance in both resources and influence between public and 
private interests or, as David Marsh puts it, ‘the pattern of structured inequality 
that is reflected in political institutions and processes’ (2002: 19). In the US in 
particular, corporations are far from embarrassed about their domination of 
policy-making. As one seasoned observer of Washington politics comments:  
[The lobbyists’] leverage is much more open, you know you see them in halls of Congress 
and they don’t have to grease a deal in a back room because they’re going to do it with a 
sledgehammer right there in front of every trade reporter and every Congressional hearing. 
. .. It’s not like you have to secretly cut Rupert Murdoch a deal when you can cut him a deal 
and the entire industry at the front end.  
Clearly, the situation is rather different in the UK, where such behaviour is 
frowned on and where unfettered market forces are likely to face many more 
obstacles. With a much stronger commitment to public service and a recent 
memory of social democracy, the deals are simply more likely to take place in 
private.  
 
In this situation, calls to increase openness and participation while retaining 
the structural and ideological constraints of the current policy-making system 
are largely symbolic. A system dominated by the agreement of the main 
players on the role of market forces and the minimizing of any obstacles to 
private accumulation will change only when forced to do so. The bumper 
stickers, write-in campaigns, emails, marches, meetings and teach-ins against 
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the FCC in 2003/4 characterized a movement that was not invited to the 
proceedings but instead asserted its right to be heard. That is not a 
vindication of pluralism but a sign of its weakness.  
Note  
This research was carried out during study leave enabled by an ESRC grant. Interviews were 
conducted in London and Washington DC between October 2004 and January 2005. My 
thanks to James Curran and Aeron Davis for their very helpful comments.  
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